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ABSTRACT
Situated within feminist technoscience studies and affect theory, this article explores the
methodological specificities of working with Drosophila Melanogaster, commonly known as fruit
flies. Based on a year of participatory observation in a fly lab, the article challenges the moder-
nist imaginaries of laboratory work as disembodied, detached and objective. It suggests that la-
boratory work is instead an interactive, embodied and affective process that takes place in prox-
imity between human and non-human, subject and object. The article therefore contributes to
earlier feminist science studies arguing that doing science is an interactive, procedural, socio-cul-
tural phenomenon. However, while most such previous works focus on issues such as connec-
tions, companionship, love and empathy, this article asks what methodological contributions can
come from experiencing the intensity of more than human encounters that inspire undesirable
feelings such as disgust. 
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In this article,
I use ethnographic material collected from
a year of participatory observation in an
Alzheimer’s laboratory in Sweden in which
scientists work with Drosophila Melanoga-
ster, commonly known as fruit flies. Situat-
ed within feminist technoscience studies
and affect theory, I argue that doing sci-
ence in the lab and working with flies is an
intimate, embodied, intra-active and affec-
tive process through which the object and
subject of research co-produce one another
(cf. Barad 2007; Mayers 2015). I use the
term becoming fly-sensitized in order to
highlight the material-discursive transfor-
mative processes of knowledge production
in the lab. I discuss how I became a
Drosophilist through everyday practices of
doing Alzheimers disease (AD) science, as I
had to learn to see, move and feel different-
ly with the flies. Last but not least, I ex-
plore my subjective relationship with the
flies and the sensation of disgust I constant-
ly felt while working with them. I discuss
disgust not as an emotion, but as an affec-
tive methodological tool which not only cap-
tures the intra-active and material-discur-
sive modes of doing science, but which also
enables me to ask different research ques-
tions, such as whose lives matters within
the contemporary science economy. I also
ask what kinds of empirical material one
can collect by thinking through the con-
cept of intimacy as affective encounters that
are not inspired by the warm feelings of
love and companionship that fluffy animals
such as dogs trigger (Haraway 2008), but
instead are saturated with the repellent in-
tensity of disgust and discomfort of being
intimate with the abject, here fruit flies.
Finally I ask whether, in thinking through
multi-species intimacy, one can rethink
ethics as a relational process of becoming
with that extends beyond the comfort zone
of “nearby geographies” (Bull 2014). 
INTIMACY AND
AFFECTIVE METHODOLOGIES
In the humanities and social sciences, the
notion of intimacy has often been discussed
in relation to partnership, family life, care
and reproduction (cf. Jamieson 2011;
Jankowiak and Paladino 2008). My own
contribution approaches the concept of in-
timacy through material feminism, in which
the unit of analysis is the material–discur-
sive, human–nonhuman, social, technologi-
cal and biological relations that together
are performative of bodies and the worlds
they inhabit (e.g. Barad 2007; Alaimo &
Hekman 2008). In this theoretical ap-
proach, entities are always already a “con-
tact zone”, to use a term coined by the
feminist technoscience scholar Stacy
Alaimo, materialized through situated rela-
tions. This approach embodies a critique of
“human exceptionalism” (Haraway 2008)
that takes the human subject (often the
white, heterosexual, European man) to be
at the center of the world and separated
from the rest of it, including nature and the
non-human other. The approach promotes
a more inclusive understanding not only of
humans, but also of the “subjects of a life”
(Birke et al. 2004, 174), thus acknowledg-
ing the entanglement of human bodies
with other life forms, as well as human abil-
ities and consciousness as always already
multispecies (see Nayar 2014). It is this
multispecies relationality that I find impor-
tant in understanding intimacy in the labo-
ratory. In other words, intimacy as yet an-
other fuzzy category is traditionally bound
to the subject, understood as a human at-
tribute and embedded in binaries such as
public–private, nature–culture, self–other
(mentioned in Jamieson 2011). However,
as feminist scholars such as gender studies
scholars Wibke Straube (forthcoming) and
Helga Sadowski (2016) have argued,
among others, intimacy transgresses the
classical binaries of nature–culture, body–
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technology, and human–nonhuman. For
instance, Straube’s work on intimacy draws
on the relationality between the “deviant”
human body and polluted nature that, in-
stead of reinforcing the hierarchical prioriti-
zation of the human body, suggests a new
understanding of non-hierarchical relation-
ality with nature and ecological others. 
My interest in the concept of multi-
species intimacy is also a methodological
one. The gender studies and animal studies
scholar Kathryn Gillespie (2017) uses the
term as a methodological tool for analyzing
more than just human performative prac-
tices of doing science. According to her, in-
timacy is entangled with empathy, being “a
type of caring perception focused on at-
tending to another’s experience of wellbe-
ing”, a blend of emotion and cognition in
which we enter into relations with others,
animals, the environment and the world.
We are therefore called upon to be respon-
sible and to attend to other’s diverse modes
of vulnerability and situated needs. In labo-
ratory work, therefore, intimacy is a matter
of paying attention to lived experiences
through what Gillespie calls a “slow-re-
search” process that takes particularities
and details as its point of departure. This is
a time-consuming process: being attentive
to and accountable for such local particu-
larities and intimacies necessitates, as the
environmental humanities scholar Timothy
Morton argues: 
“thinking and practicing weakness rather than
mastery, fragmentariness rather than holism,
and deconstructive tentativeness rather than
aggressive assertion” (Morton 2010, 278). 
Although I take the notion of multispecies
intimacy from Gillespie (2017), my under-
standing of the concept is slightly different.
First, intimacy is not innocent but poten-
tially violent (Pain 2014), particularly with-
in the context of laboratory work. In fact,
as the feminist technoscience scholar Tora
Holmberg (2011) argues, laboratory work
is embedded within an economy of “mortal
love” in which intimacy simultaneously co-
exists with distance. In other words, scien-
tists simultaneously care for the animal, yet
also use it in experiments and eventually kill
the animal which they are usually able to
do because they distance themselves from
it, although it is the object of their care and
love. Scientists strive to practice killing well
and killing with care. Care, empathy and
intimacy here constitute complex relations
that goes beyond just empathy with others
and attending to their needs. 
Secondly, I relate the concept of intima-
cy to affect theories rather than emotion.
According to aesthetics and communica-
tion scholars Britta Knudsen and Carsten
Stage: 
“affects travel between (human and non-hu-
man) bodies and are experienced subjective-
ly”, yet “they are often perceived as surprising
or somehow beyond the will and conscious
intentionality of the affected body” (Knudsen
and Stage 2015, 5).
In my understanding, therefore, intimacy is
an affective material-discursive process that,
according to Sadowski (2016), shapes bod-
ies and the worlds they inhabit in relation
to other bodies that are not necessarily hu-
man. Through affective intimacy, bodies
perform one another, animate each other
simultaneously. Feminist technoscience
scholar Natasha Myers (2015) calls this
“intra-animacy”. Following Sadowski,
therefore, affective intimacy is an embodied
performative relationality that “is not ne-
cessarily related to feelings and emotion, al-
though they might emerge in the mix of af-
fects, which is affection” (2016, 51).
ON BECOMING FLY-SENSATIZED
Field note April, 2012: A visit to the labora-
tory. The same sensation of disgust that
always makes me feel nauseous hits me again,
even before I enter the lab. The flies. The
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flies are haunting me. They are getting into
me. I put on my white lab coat. I am sitting
behind the microscope, holding my brush.
Turning the tube and bouncing it on the
plate; the plate releases nitrous oxide. The
flies fall asleep on the plate. I push it under
the microscope. The legs are frozen straight
upward as if they are dead. The legs are
pointing at me. The two front legs look like
a sharp arrow, following the rest of the body.
Looking at it through the lens of the
microscope, the arrow is piercing through
me. I can’t breathe. My pulse rises up. The
arrow changes as the fly moves, the fly is
alive. I am shocked. Pushing the first tube
away, I take the next one, trying to forget
about the fly inside me. Try to forget that it
is moving, crawling and growing. That it is
taking over. Repeat to myself like a mantra:
curly wings, red eyes, hairs on the shoulder.
Trying to imagine that I am picking berries
and separating the black berries from the
white ones. The black ones are male, the
white ones are female.1 I try to focus on the
colours only and the hair as if they are
disembodied, as if there is no fly. As if my
body closes up in this act of disembodiment.
I rub my hands against the white coat. My
skin is not the barrier, but the white coat is.
What is it about the white coat? It is a sense
of security and protection, I guess. It
resonates with cleanliness and control. It is
where my body ends and the flies’ bodies
begin. It is the distinct line. It is an extra
skin. It detaches me, distances me and
protects me from touching and being
touched, from closeness and connection. As
if nothing can pierce in and nothing can get
out. Closed and clean. The border between
the inside and outside. The non-negotiable
border between ‘I’ and the flies: steady, fixed
with the long history of modernity and
human exceptionalism. The flies move inside
me again. The white coat is a fraud! I ask,
who are you who are so strangely me?
One of the first things I learned in the lab
was to work with the microscope to tell the
sex of the flies. The first time I looked at one,
I was disoriented. I had to sedate the
transgenic fruit flies and put them on a plate
under the lens. I used sedation to make them
lie still so that they would not move away.
However, sedation was risky for the flies. It
would have killed them had I left them
sedated for a long time. Looking through
the microscope itself, I was simultaneously
becoming intimate with the flies while
distancing myself from them, as I objectified
them in terms of their disembodied body
parts such as hair and eyes – an act of
distancing that allowed me to kill them in
large numbers. This meant embodying the
intensity of mortal love, as I both cared for
the flies and killed them with care.
Embodying mortal love enacted me as the
AD technician in the lab as much as it
enacted the transgenic fruit flies under my
microscope as objects of exploration. 
I had to learn how to synchronize my
hand, holding and moving the brush and
pushing and pulling the flies with it at the
right angle and with the right amount of
pressure so as to avoid squashing them or
knocking them off the plate.2 I had to learn
to coordinate my hand movements with my
vision while looking through the micro-
scope, which was far from familiar. And I had
to learn to see and recognize the ‘right’3
transgenic fruit flies quickly. As the
anthropologist of science Natasha Myers
argues, laboratory work requires technicians
to “engage their bodies actively in their
work” (2015, 1). She calls this the “kin-
esthetic” of practicing science, that is, “the
visceral sensibilities, movements, and
muscular knowledge that modelers bring to
their body experiments”. In a similar vein,
Tora Holmberg argues that: 
“experimentalists-in-the-making must (…)
become habituated to the laboratory animals.
To get the right grip, [they] must get to
know the animal” (Holmberg 2008, 322). 
So, I had to get habituated to the practices
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of working with the flies and its tech-
nologies, as well as to my own extended
body, to my new sense of vision and to my
extended hand with the brush. But I also had
to care for the flies, not only in terms of
mindfulness but in material ways, as I
touched them, fed them, changed their
tubes, looked at them and poked them with
the brush under the microscope: I had to
become fly-sensitized. Becoming fly-sensi-
tized is a matter of embodied intimacy and
intra-animacy, as I had to habituate myself to
the transgenic fruit flies, their bodies, their
movements and their bodily vulnerabilities
and needs. This, according to Gillespie
(2017), is the dynamic aspect of multispecies
intimacy. Thus I was as much enacted as a
drosophilist as the dosophila was enacted as
a test object.
Becoming fly-sensitized brings to the fore
an alternative mode of scientific practice to
modernist ways of doing science. In other
words, claiming the position of becoming
fly-sensitized helps me move away from the
ideal of progressive scientific discoveries that
is accompanied by narratives and practices of
domination, of the conquest and exploi-
tation of nature as passive and inferior.
Instead, to go back to Timothy Morton
again (2010, 278), it helps to think with and
practice weakness “rather than mastery,
fragmentariness rather than holism, and
deconstructive tentativeness rather than
aggressive assertion”.
To work through the embodied intimacy
and situatedness of scientific practices in a fly
lab underlines the importance of feminist
modes of doing science and care. It also
highlights the existing power relations that
are constitutive parts of everyday practices of
doing life science and the facts produced in
the laboratory. This supports the argument
that care is not innocent, care and caring for
transgenic fruit flies being entangled with
killing (see also Holmberg 2011) and
embedded in a relationship of use (Haraway
2008). 
DISGUST AND ETHICS
My becoming fly-sensitized was also a matter
of my personal relationship with the flies. I
have always hated flies – or at least been
disgusted by them. Imagine my face upon
entering the lab and realizing that I had to
look at dozens of fruit flies every day, not
from the safety of a distant, closed vial, but
closely magnified under the lens of the
microscope. The first time I had such an
encounter, I managed to control myself for
over twenty minutes before the dizziness and
nausea overwhelmed me, and I had to let go.
I had to go to the coffee room, find an
empty couch and lie down for some minutes
until my vision became clear again. That was
what the intensity of working with the flies
meant to me. Imagine also my ethical
dilemma over the prospect of killing them,
which gave me guilty pleasure. The funny
thing was that I did not experience such a
strong dilemma over killing them in the
kitchen in our collective. On the contrary, I
would hysterically chase them around and
smash them against the wall. But it felt
different in the lab. The very fact that I was
wearing the white coat and had control over
their lives put me in the awkward position of
experiencing an ethical dilemma, which is
what inspired me to write my dissertation
about human–animal relations and the ethics
of killability in laboratory practices.
Nonetheless I used disgust as a tool with
which to explore ethics in the lab. I realized
that disgust is ethically important, not only
because it made me sick or because it
exposed an ethical dilemma in the lab over
whether to kill a living organism for scientific
purposes or not. Disgust was ethically
important to me because it communicated
my anxieties to me about science, laboratory,
death, disease, waste and flies. As Sara
Ahmed (2014) argues, feelings such as
disgust are closely linked to social abjection;
they are cultural, historical stories that are
associated with particular bodies. Moreover,
such feelings are not something abstract that
happens inside a subject, but affective
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performative bodily realities that happen
between bodies and through close intimate
encounters. These feelings do things,
materializing realities in different ways.
Inspired by Ahmed, among others, Jacob
Bull (2014), writing about ticks, discusses
the possibilities of an ethical response to
negatively loaded encounters that are
accompanied by feelings such as disgust, fear
and repulsion rather than love and com-
passion. In fact, he identifies a limit within
ethical writing about human and animal
encounters, in which only animals that are
close to humans have been the object of
ethical concern. As Bull (2014) argues,
accounts of multispecies ethics or the ethics
of relationality are often limited to those
animals with which humans have close
relations, such as domestic animals, “com-
panion species” (Haraway 2008), animals on
which we rely for food (Twine 2010) and at
certain points laboratory animals with which
we recognize kinship as fellow mammals,
such as apes and mice (Haraway 1997).
Building on Bull’s work, I therefore define
disgust as a methodological tool. 
Why is it important to stay with disgust as
an ethical and affective method of inquiry, or
to call this ‘affective intimacy’? First of all, as
Myers says (2015, 1), it highlights the
embodied reality of doing science
“affectively”. She argues that doing labora-
tory work requires technicians to “get
entangled – kinesthetically and affectively – in
their modelling efforts” (2015, 1, italics in
the original). I have discussed the kinesthesia
of doing laboratory work in the previous
section. In this section, I discuss disgust as an
affective component of doing science. In
other words, I tend toward what Myers
defines as affect, namely “the energetics,
intensities, and emotions that propagate
through” laboratory work. This makes
possible an ethic that does not rely on
humanistic morality, but an ethics of
relationality. Myers understands both the
kinesthetic and affective realities of doing
laboratory work as “feeling”: not as
emotions, that is, as the former highlights the
feeling of the organism, while the latter refers
to a feeling for the organism. Staying with
such affective moments of intimacy in
laboratory work is essential because it makes
it possible for me to write about ethics and
flies, which are ‘the Other’ not only of
humans, but of a majority of the animal
kingdom. In other words, flies are enacted as
non-animal in the lab and are therefore
killable. On the one hand, they are deemed
killable because they do not feature any-
where in ethical guidelines, they are abject
socio-culturally and they are not considered
sentient beings. On the other hand they are
deemed killable because they are one of the
most valuable and prestigious laboratory
models, perfectly black boxed and ready to
use in any experiment across the world –
what Tora Holmberg and Malin Ideland
(2009) call being an ordinary treasure. To
stay with this position of being non-animal,
which is often accompanied by fear and
disgust, challenges existing ethics and ethical
thinking in the humanities and social
sciences, which are more attuned to the
bigger and more familiar animals as the
objects of (humanistic) ethics. In other
words, as Bull (2014) writes, animals such as
ticks are unlovable parasites with which
humans rarely feel close. He argues that
staying with the negative emotions that
overwhelmed him in his encounters with
ticks and attending to such dynamic emo-
tions were crucial to his understanding of
“human-animal interaction” because they
told stories about how particular bodies are
constructed as the undesirable, abject Other
(2014, 79). His “aim is not to replace an
ethics of love with one of disgust”; rather, he
wishes to stay with the intensity of disgust to
highlight what staying with disgust may
create (2014, 80). As Bull writes, “parasitism
and the disgust it conjures reemphasizes the
politics of multi-species worlds” (2014, 80)
and an ethics that is inspired by Harawayian
response-ability. In other words, such affective
intimacy can be a promising method of doing
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science ethically, as well as rethinking ethics
in terms of complex relationalities.
I therefore suggest that disgust is an
analytical tool with the potential to be made
accountable to the empirical material,
affective intimacies and embodied realities of
knowledge production practices, therefore
developing other ways of, as Knudsen and
Stage write, “noticing and attending within
our research endeavors”. According to
Knudsen and Stage (2015), affective method
is a strategy for “asking research questions
and formulating research agendas relating to
affective processes, collecting or producing
embodied data and making sense of these
data in order to create academic
knowledge”. Such methodologies thus
emphasize that knowledge production
always already consists of intimate, bodily,
fleeting and material processes.
CONCLUSION
In this article, in which I think with trans-
genic fruit flies in the context of laboratory
work and the life sciences, I have discussed
intimacy as transformative affective multi-
species processes of becoming that are al-
ways already entangled with killing and
death. I argued that, in the context of a fly
lab, intimacy transgresses the boundaries of
human–nonhuman, intimacy–distance, sub-
ject–object. I have suggested that adopting
disgust as a tool makes a contribution to
discussions of intimacy that detach intimacy
from love, sexuality and human empathy, a
form of sharing and caring that is mixed
with killing. I also suggested that intimacy
is a methodological tool, specifically an af-
fective methodology. That is, I have dis-
cussed disgust and rotting smells in terms
of stomach-wrenching affective moments
of doing science and getting intimate with
the flies, arguing that staying with such
moments can provide different material,
unorthodox ways of doing science, thereby
producing other kinds of knowledge about
bodies and the worlds they inhabit. 
NOTES
1. The male flies have darker genitalia (almost
blackish), and the females have white genitalia.  
2. The plate constantly released nitrogen to keep
the flies under sedation. Once they were moved
away from the plate, the flies woke up quickly.
3. Those with the exact genetic combinations I
needed.
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